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BIANNUAL SURVEY
he was unable to discover the city's ownership of land upon which
he was injured, since title was procured through a condemnation
proceeding which the "usuar' search would not reveal." In spite
of the plaintiff's apparent diligence, the court correctly refused
to permit an extension, reiterating the specific language of the statute
which permits an extension only in the following cases: where the
claimant is an infant, or physically incapacitated, or incompetent,
and by reason of such disability fails to file; where the claimant
dies within the filing period; and where the claimant fails to file
because of reliance on written settlement representations.'
The harshness of such a result indicates the need for additional
discretion in the courts to provide some outlet for the diligent
plaintiff where no prejudice to the city is shown '10 or where the
filing is not unreasonably late. It may be contended that a more
thorough search by the plaintiff would have resulted in discovery
of the city's ownership since a lis pendens was filed as part of the
condemnation proceeding. However, should such a degree of dili-
gence be required where the loss is so complete and the time for
filing so short? This problem is especially distressing where there
is neither a showing of negligence on the plaintiff's part nor prejudice
to the city.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302: No basis for jurisdiction over defendant who was
domiciliary at time act complained of was committed.
CPLR 302 vests the New York courts with wide powers of
jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants served with process
outside the state." The problem has arisen, however, as to whether
the statute is limited to defendants who are non-domiciliaries not
S Id. at 427, 260 N.Y.S2d at 668.
9 N.Y. MuNIc. LAW § 50-e 5. See, e.g., Franco v. City of New York,
270 App. Div. 1050, 63 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2d Dep't 1946) (physical incapacity);
Oliveras v. New York City Trans. Auth., 27 Misc. 2d 711, 207 N.Y.S.2d
313 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960) (infancy); Newman v. City of Geneva,
2 Misc. 2d 646, 153 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1956) (settlement
representations); Krauss v. Board of Educ., 199 Misc. 505, 103 N.Y.S.2d
939 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (infancy).
20 Kaiser v. Town of Sauna, 20 App. Div. 2d 312, 315, 247 N.Y.S.2d 9, 12
(4th Dep't 1964).
11 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state ... ; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state."
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only at the time of service but also at the time the acts complained
of were committed.
In State v. Associated Bldg. Contractors of the TripleCities, Inc.,12 the cause of action accrued while the defendant was
a New York domiciliary, but service of process was made after
the defendant became a bona fide domiciliary of Ohio. The court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and held that in order
for CPLR 302 to be applicable the defendant must be a non-
domiciliary both at the time the acts complained of were com-
mitted and at the time of service of process. The court asserted
that a jurisdictional "gap" existed which immunized the defendant
from New York's jurisdiction, both as a domiciliary and as a
non-domiciliary. 13 Thus, according to the instant case, a defendant
who committed a tortious act while a New York domiciliary but
purposely fled New York and became a bona fide non-domiciliary
prior to service of process is not subject to New York's jurisdiction."4
In comparison, a defendant who committed a tortious act in New
York but was never a New York domiciliary would be subject to
jurisdiction here.
This arbitrary distinction apparently could not have been in-
tended by the legislature and should not have been made unless
unequivocally stated by the language of CPLR 302. That such an
interpretation was not intended is well illustrated by the earlier case
of O'Connor v. Wells,' 5 which apparently was not brought to the
attention of the court in the instant case. In O'Connor, the court
was faced with the same factual pattern as in the instant case, i.e.,
the defendant was a domiciliary when the alleged acts complained
of were committed but was a non-domiciliary at the time of service
of process. The court, however, rejected defendant's motion for
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that CPLR 302
is explicitly applicable to "any non-domiciliary"; moreover, the
use of the word "any," which has been judicially defined to mean
"all" or "every," was construed to import no limitation. 6  There-
fore, since the defendant was a non-domiciliary at the time he was
served with process, he was within the ambit of the statute.
The view expressed in O'Connor should prevail in subsequent
decisions. The most that can be argued in favor of the decision
in the instant case is that the term non-domiciliary as used in
12 47 Misc. 2d 699, 263 N.Y.$.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1965).
:3 id. at 701, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
14 See 7B McKINNE.Y's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 55 (1965) written
prior to the report of the instant case wherein it is stated that CPLR 302 is
not so limited.
15 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Greene County 1964);
cf. Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1965).
16 O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 1076, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863
(Sup. Ct. Greene County 1965). (Emphasis added.)
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CPLR 302 is somewhat eqpuivocal. In such a situation, however,
since the language does not compel it, and since the CPLR is
intended to be construed liberally,'7 there appears to be no valid
reason why the courts should hold that a "gap" exists which would
enable a defendant to evade the jurisdiction of New York.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Limited partner held subject to personal juris-
diction on basis of his endorsement outside New York of a
note for benefit of the New York partnership.
In order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, the
requirements of the CPLR and of federal "due process" must be
satisfied. Under CPLR 302(a) (1), jurisdiction is asserted over a
non-domiciliary who "transacts any business" in New York and is
sued in connection with that business. In Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,"" the Court of Appeals
stated that the test for jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) is
whether the non-domiciliary has "engaged in some purposeful
activity in this state in connection with the matter in suit." '- The
United States Supreme Court, in comparison, has stated that "due
process" requires for valid in personam jurisdiction "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protection of its laws." 20  The similarity of the two
tests indicates that the Court of Appeals has interpreted the intent
of the New York legislature, by its enactment of 302, as utilizing
its full constitutional power in exercising jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries who have business contacts with this state.
The full extent to which this jurisdiction will extend has not,
as yet, been ascertained. Its comprehensiveness, however, is in-
dicated by the recent appellate division case of Banco Espanol de
Credito v. DuPont,2' wherein the defendant, having only minimal
contacts with New York, was held subject to New York's juris-
diction. In this case, a suit on a promissory note, the non-
domiciliary defendant's only contact with New York was his status
as an accommodation endorser on the promissory note of a
Delaware corporation for the purpose of giving a New York
partnership, -in which he was a limited partner, the benefit of his
credit.
Justice Steuer voiced a strong dissent to the majority's holding
that the defendant was subject to in personam jurisdiction under
1 CPLR 104.
1s 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
19 Id. at 457, 209 N.E.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
20 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
2124 App. Div. 2d 445, 261 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1965) (memorandum
opinion).
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